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1 Introduction
Contemporary research on artificial intelligence (AI) tends to be more analytic
than synthetic [16]. Analytic AI research focuses on a certain aspect of
intelligence such as perception, learning or problem-solving in detail and
often in isolation with other aspects. For example, in recent times, AI systems
based on statistical techniques such as deep neural networks (DNNs) capable
of recognizing objects, processing speech and playing video games have
received a lot of research efforts and public attention. In contrast to analytic
AI research, synthetic AI research focuses on the interaction between several
aspects of intelligence with the goal of more generally intelligent systems
that are able to perform various tasks in complex environments.
Several problems are associated with current, mostly deep learning-based
AI systems that originate from analytic research [15, 18, 7, 25, 19]. First,
they tend to be data-hungry, requiring a lot of training examples in order
to learn and being unable to learn abstract rules, causal relationships and
concepts. Second, they usually have a narrow area of competence and may
even make rather surprising errors in their specialized domain. For example,
an object recognition system trained on images of guns does not recognize
dogs, and in some cases it can falsely classify a turtle as a gun [8]. Third,
it is not always easy for humans to understand how and why these systems
work the way they do (the black box problem), complicating interactions
and trust between them and humans. Humans cannot apply their existing
mental models about the human mind (theory of mind) to them in order
to predict and reason about their motivations and behavior: their inner
workings or ways of processing information (mainly based on statistics) are
somewhat different, and they do not share the same language, gestures and
other means of communication that are familiar to us. This is not necessarily
a problem if the systems are designed as cognitive prostheses, i.e. to replace
human capabilities and require zero collaboration with humans. However,
when their purpose is to complement and closely collaborate with humans
(cognitive orthotics), it is especially important that the system is capable of
human-level interaction and promotes trust.
To solve these problems, the synthetic approach to AI end especially taking
inspiration from the human mind in designing general AI systems is promising
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- after all, humans currently are the best example of general intelligence
[15, 19]. For instance, humans are competent in several complex domains, can
often learn from just a few examples, and excel at learning abstract, causal
and conceptual knowledge. In addition, psychological similarity between
humans and machines could improve understanding, trust and collaboration
between them [31, 7]. Insights on human intelligence (or cognition) can be
drawn from many fields such as cognitive science, neuroscience and psychology.
For example, cognitive architectures studied in cognitive science are unified
models of the fixed structure and processes of the human mind similar to
grand theories in other fields such as physics, and they usually involve both
an abstract model and a low-level computational implementation [24, 13]. In
the implementation, cognitive structures and processes such as perception,
attention, learning, reasoning and language are mimicked by computational
methods such as neural and semantic networks, decision trees, description
logic, and so on, all in a unified framework. This computational formalization
not only helps cognitive scientists develop and validate cognitive theories but
may also provide a platform for general AI systems. The recent standard
model of the mind represents an attempt to reach consensus on cognition and
is intended as a general abstract layout for cognitive architectures [14].
Another general model of cognition comes from an old, less-known psy-
chological theory called perceptual control theory (PCT) that is based on
control theory [20]. Control theory is a mathematical theory that models
a process of maintaining variables such as temperature or speed in certain
pre-determined goal states amidst changing conditions [29]. PCT is based on
the idea that all human behavior, too, can be seen as control of perceptual
variables. According to PCT, cognition consists of a hierarchy of controller
units that constantly compare input perceptions to goal perceptions and
attempt to minimize errors between them. PCT says that it is perceptual
input that is under control, not behavioral output. This view is in contrast
with the sense-think-act process underlying traditional cognitive architectures
and the standard model that say output of the system is some function of
input.
In this thesis, our purpose was to find out how promising the standard model
and the PCT model are as high-level layouts for comprehensive, human-like
cognitive architectures and thus possible paths to general AI. We present a
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comparative theoretical analysis of the standard model and the PCT model
based on how they address certain functional criteria gathered from liter-
ature on human-like cognition. Our precise research questions were as follows.
1. How does the standard model on a theoretical level address the functions
required from human-like cognition?
2. How does the PCT model on a theoretical level address the functions
required from human-like cognition?
The thesis is organized as follows: In Background, we explain the concepts
of cognition and cognitive architecture in more detail and offer a brief
introduction to the standard model and the PCT model. In Methods, we
explain why we chose to perform a comparative analysis on the specific
models and introduce the functional criteria used in the comparison. In
Results, we present the results of our comparative analysis. Finally, we end
with a discussion of our results and conclude.
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2 Background
In this chapter, we introduce the relevant concepts of the thesis. First, we
look at how the concept of cognition is defined in different paradigms of
cognitive science. Second, we explain the concept of a cognitive architecture
in cognitive science. Finally, we introduce the standard model and the PCT
model.
2.1 Cognition
A basic tenet in the field of cognitive science is that cognition is some form of
information-processing [10, 4]. Cognitive science can be divided into several
paradigms or schools of thought that approach this differently. Usually, a
division has been done between three major approaches: classical, connectivist
and embodied. These approaches are summarized in Table 1.
The classical approach likens the human mind to a digital computer and
interprets information-processing mainly as rule-based symbol manipulation
[4]. The focus of this approach is problem-solving in simple and well-defined
domains such as games where solutions can be found by searching through
a problem space. Cognitive systems studied by the approach mostly in-
clude higher-level systems such as reasoning, planning, problem-solving and
language.
The connectivist approach sees the mind not as a serial, logical digital
computer but as a parallel sub-symbolic processor of statistical patterns [4].
It models the mind with artificial neural networks (ANNs) inspired by real
neural networks of the human brain. ANNs are able to learn from example
and usually deal better with uncertainty than rule-based symbolic processors.
Issues pertaining to the "lower" levels of cognition such as perception and
motor action have traditionally been the focus of connectivists.
The embodied approach emphasizes the role of the whole body in cognitive
processing and direct connections between sensing and acting in contrast to
the traditional sense-think-act process of classicists and connectivists in which
some kind of processing of mental representations (thinking) usually occurs
between sensing and action [4]. According to the extended mind hypothesis
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Table 1: Different schools of thought in cognitive science.
Approach Manner of infor-mation-processing
Nature of
cognitive architecture
Modeled aspects of
cognition
Classical
Centralized, rule-
based, logical,
serial, symbolic
Computer-like: structure
and process separate
Abstract reasoning,
problem-solving,
planning
Connectivist
Decentralized,
pattern-based,
statistical, parallel,
dynamic
Brain-like: structure
and process together
Perception, action,
low-level reasoning
and planning
Embodied
Decentralized,
embodied, direct,
reactive, dynamic
? Perception, action
of the embodied approach, the mind is not separated from the environment.
A radical embodied view says that interaction between cognition and the
environment via the body is so intertwined and real-time that there is no
need to form and process any internal knowledge representations about the
environment. It is thought that the mind does not necessarily need complex
internal models of the world because the world already is its own model. The
embodied approach is still relatively new and lacks established models and
theories.
2.2 Cognitive architectures
In 1973, Allen Newell pointed out the problem with psychological micro-
theories that attempt to explain only specific parts of cognition, prompting
a search for a unified theory of cognition - a cognitive architecture [24]. Cog-
nitive architectures are abstract models of the fixed structure and processes
of the human mind in cognitive science [13, 43, 16]. The term fixed means
unchangeable over time and between situations. Cognitive architectures
attempt to model different cognitive systems or functions and their relation-
ships to each other in a unified manner without focusing solely on a certain
singular function. Cognitive functions include, for example, perception, at-
tention, learning, reasoning, problem-solving, planning, language, memory,
emotions, motivation, personality, and imagination.
Usually, a cognitive architecture is expressed both as an abstract model as
well as an implementation of that model in the form of a software framework,
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Figure 1: Timeline including a small subset of cognitive architectures [43].
and this framework can then be used to build an instance of artificial cognition
for a particular task or purpose [13, 43, 16]. Cognitive architectures differ
in terms of how much functionality is included in the framework and how
much has to be programmed by the user of the architecture. For example,
a cognitive architecture may specify a process and structure for handling
certain type of knowledge but the knowledge content itself must be supplied
by the user. On the other hand, some cognitive architectures are able to
learn the required knowledge from experience without needing as much
preprogramming. Many cognitive architectures are open source projects
whose contributors include researchers and software engineers from multiple
disciplines.
Currently, several hundred cognitive architectures exist [13]. A subset of them
on a timeline is shown in Figure 1. Some architectures, for example Soar and
ACT-R, have been in development for decades and established themselves
as notable candidate theories of cognition. Cognitive architectures differ in
terms of their underlying assumptions about how the human mind works,
motivation, inspiration, implementation technology, and so on [43]. Certain
cognitive functions such as problem-solving, planning and memory have
received more attention than other functions such as emotions, motivation,
personality and social intelligence.
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Cognitive architectures can be categorized as symbolic, hybrid or emergent
based on their patterns for processing knowledge [43]. Symbolic architectures
originate from the classical school of cognitive science and tend to utilize tech-
niques of the GOFAI (Good Old-Fashioned Artificial Intelligence) paradigm
of AI. Knowledge is represented as symbols and its processing occurs through
formal logic. These architectures may not include as many capabilities for
processing low-level information such as sensations or executing motor ac-
tions - instead, the focus tends to be on high-level, internal processing. They
are especially suitable when deterministic behavior is desired although a
few architectures use fuzzy instead of classic logic. Symbolic architectures
are less suitable for recognizing patterns in input information and dealing
with uncertain input. Examples of these kind of architectures include Soar,
ACT-R and ICARUS. Emergent architectures originate from the connectivist
school of cognitive science and are commonly utilized in behavior-based
robotics. They often involve a hierarchical structure that is inspired by
the brain. In this hierarchy, the lower levels may process and store sensory
information in neural networks or by other statistical techniques (also known
as bottom-up processing) while the higher levels control attention and select
actions based on the output of the lower levels. Emergent architectures may
not include higher-level capabilities such as problem-solving and planning
- instead, they focus mainly on the interaction between attention, percep-
tion and motor action. Emergent architectures are more capable of dealing
with uncertainty and recognizing statistical patterns in input information.
Examples of these architectures include ARCADIA, LIDA and BBD. Hy-
brid architectures tend to process both symbolic and emergent knowledge
in a hierarchical structure in which sub-symbolic bottom-up knowledge is
combined with symbolic top-down knowledge. This seems to most closely
follow our intuition of how the human mind works: more symbolic rule-based
processing (planning, problem-solving, memory) is combined with numeric
pattern-based processing (perception). Examples of hybrid architectures
include CLARION, CREST and 4CAPS. In addition to these three classes -
symbolic, emergent and hybrid - cognitive architectures can be classified into
embodied architectures that model the physical body and its role in cognitive
processing and developmental architectures that take inspiration from human
cognitive development.
The existence of symbolic, emergent and hybrid cognitive architectures reflects
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the fact that cognitive activity can be modeled at multiple timescales or levels
of abstraction [24]. Cognition ranges from fast, concrete and primitive neural
processing such as perception to slow, abstract and high-level processing
such as language and social cognition. In between, there are cognitive and
rational levels that are constrained by the lower neural level and offer a
foundation to the higher levels. Emergent architectures mainly model the
neural level, symbolic architectures mainly model levels above the neural
level called levels of deliberate action, and hybrid architectures model all
levels. In some of those cognitive architectures that model levels of deliberate
action, higher-level processing is assumed to emerge from the knowledge
and skills (memory content) acquired by an architecture through sequential
cognitive cycles while in others, higher-level processing has its own dedicated
modules.
The computational implementations of cognitive architectures have two ben-
efits [13, 43, 16]. First, they help cognitive scientists validate and further
develop their cognitive theories. Various psychological experiments have
been successfully replicated with cognitive architectures for validation pur-
poses. Similar performance between a cognitive architecture and a human
in a particular experiment gives indication that the architecture accurately
models some aspect of human cognition. Second, cognitive architectures are
useful platforms for those in the field of AI who are interested in building
software applications that exhibit general artificial intelligence. The goal of
general AI is to build artificial systems that can function in complex and
variable environments and tasks which is a typical human capability requiring
interaction between several cognitive functions. Cognitive architectures can
be used to build software agents that function in virtual environments or
in the real world via a physical robot body, and they have been applied in
several ways in practice. One application category is practical tasks, for
example navigating and collecting items in unknown environments, tutoring,
cleaning, and making medical assessments. Other application categories in-
clude systems that are able to collaborate with humans, systems for natural
language processing such as syntactic and semantic parsing, classification
and pattern recognition, standalone machine vision tasks, video and board
games, and virtual agents.
There are a few problems with many existing cognitive architectures [13,
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32, 16]. First, they tend to have limited ability to learn through experience
and generalize knowledge across tasks. Learning is often focused on physical
or mental actions instead of concepts, categories, their relations and other
declarative knowledge, and the architectures are unable to truly understand
and make many different interpretations about often partial knowledge. It
is often necessary to preprogram knowledge required in different tasks into
cognitive architectures, and an architecture that has been preprogrammed
to perform one task usually cannot perform another task. This requirement
for ad hoc preprogrammed knowledge has also made it considerably difficult
to model those cognitive systems that require lots of prerequisite knowledge
such as social intelligence and language. Second, while many cognitive archi-
tectures have been shown to excel in different tasks and some psychological
experiments have been successfully replicated with them, each task and ex-
periment has usually tested a narrow set of cognitive functions in a somewhat
artificial laboratory setting. In actuality, the architectures are often deficient
in certain cognitive functions, especially social cognition such as verbal and
non-verbal communication, emotions, metacognition, personality, creative
thinking, perception, and episodic (autobiographic) memory. All in all, most
current cognitive architectures do not seem to be unified theories of cognition
(as intended by Newell) as much as they are collections of micro-theories
regarding specific functions of cognition.
2.3 Standard model of the mind
Recently, the amount and variability of cognitive architectures provoked
a search for a common consensus regarding the mind across neuroscience,
cognitive science, robotics and artificial intelligence, resulting in the proposal
of a standard model of the mind (Figure 2) [14]. Its purpose is to provide a
general abstract layout for cognitive architectures, and it is based on three
popular cognitive architectures: Soar, ACT-R and Sigma. There is a plan
to incorporate knowledge from a larger set of cognitive architectures in the
future as new agreements on matters can be reached.
The standard model is modular, consisting of several components that
process information independently and share it with each other [14]. The
components of the standard model include perception, motor, declarative
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Figure 2: The standard model of the mind (adapted from [14]).
long-term memory, procedural long-term memory, and short-term memory
(also called working memory). Each of them can consist of smaller sub-
modules, for example declarative long-term memory can be further divided
into semantic and episodic memories if desired. Information processing
occurs in cognitive cycles of around 50 ms each, i.e. at the level of deliberate
action. Complex cognitive phenomena arise from sequences of cognitive
cycles. In each cycle, procedural memory selects a single deliberate action
that causes modifications in the working memory. A single modification
can involve, for instance, a step forward in a logical reasoning process, an
initiation of a motor action, or a fetch from long-term memory. Although
cognitive cycles run serially, parallel processing of information is possible
inside and between components. The standard model is a hybrid model: the
memory components process symbolic knowledge combined with numerical
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metadata while the perception and motor components process sub-symbolic
knowledge.
2.4 Perceptual control theory
Control theory is a mathematical theory that models a process of maintaining
variables such as temperature or speed in certain pre-determined goal states
amidst changing conditions [29]. In engineering, the theory has been applied
to building different self-adaptive systems that must exhibit autonomous and
goal-oriented behavior, for example thermostats and cruise control systems
in cars. In many of these systems, self-adaptation must occur according to
precise requirements and despite restrictions such as time or memory, and
with control theory, formal guarantees for self-adaptation can be provided.
Control theory has traditionally been used to implement self-adaptivity at
the level of hardware, for example CPU and memory. Lately, it has also
been applied to software adaptation.
Control theory is also the basis of perceptual control theory (PCT) in psychol-
ogy [20]. PCT is a general psychological theory based on the idea that all
human behavior, too, can be seen as control of perceptual variables. Accord-
ing to PCT, it is perception that is under control, not behavior. Behavior
is simply varied in order to achieve desired perceptions (goals). PCT says,
for example, that when a person attempts to catch a ball coming towards
them, it seems unlikely that they do complex calculations to figure out
where the ball is going to land in order to move to that place. Instead, they
simply move in a manner that keeps the perception of the ball a certain
way. There is no need for complex and accurate models about the world nor
predictions or planning based on them - if planning occurs, it is not about
what actions to take in order to achieve goals but about what are the desired
perceptions. PCT argues against the more traditional view of cognition as a
sense-think-act process that suggests output is some function of input; that
perception (input) controls or causes behavior (output) in a linear way. In
PCT, the term perception refers not to internal or external sensory signals
themselves but to the whole set of events that happens in the brain as the
signals travel from sensory modalities to the top levels of the brain. These
events may include the conceptualization of the signals but not necessarily
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Figure 3: A simple control system with one controller according to PCT
(adapted from [20]).
conscious awareness.
A simple PCT model consisting of a single controller is shown in Figure
3. The model involves a closed control loop where an error signal is first
calculated based on the difference between the internally predetermined goal
state and the perceived state that is the current value of the controlled
variable. This error signal is then transformed into a behavioral change that,
together with environmental disturbances outside the system’s control, affects
the value of the controlled variable and results in a new error calculation.
In other words, the system is directing its behavior based on feedback from
perception, continuously attempting to bring the error closer to zero and
perceptions closer to the goal. The system may exhibit behavior even if the
error is zero in order to maintain it at zero, and the system can appear not
to display behavior if non-behavior reduces the error.
According to PCT, cognition involves a hierarchy of controllers [20, 44].
A single PCT controller in such a hierarchy is shown in Figure 4. Each
controller receives a combined reference signal as input from a set controllers
above and outputs a reference signal to a controller below. An exception to
this is the lowest level where direct sensory signals are received as input and
motor actions are produced as output. Controllers at different levels in the
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hierarchy control different types of perceptual variables, and even abstract
concepts can be constructed as combinations of low-level perceptions. Each
controller has a memory switch and a perceptual switch that, depending
on their settings, enable the controller to be in one of four modes. If both
switches are vertically aligned, the unit is passing perceptions upwards in
the hierarchy and taking action normally (conventional control mode). If the
perceptual switch is vertically aligned and the memory switch is not, the
unit can pass perceptions upwards without taking action (passive observation
mode). If it is the other way around, the unit can take action automatically
without passing perceptions upwards (automatic mode). If neither of the
switches is vertically aligned, perceptions retrieved from memory go directly
upwards in the hierarchy (imagination mode).
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Figure 4: A single controller in a controller hierarchy according to PCT
(adapted from [20]).
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3 Methods
The amount of existing cognitive architectures is huge yet progress towards
achieving a truly general, human-like cognitive architecture seems slow [16].
We found it important to evaluate possible starting points for such an
architecture. Therefore, as our research method, we selected a comparative
analysis of the standard model and the PCT model based on literature.
Because of the limits of this thesis, we decided to focus on two models only.
We chose the standard model and the PCT model because they both strive
to be general models of cognition yet differ from each other on a fundamental
level, making for an interesting and potentially fruitful comparison. The
standard model originates from cognitive science and mostly represents the
traditional view of cognition as logical, symbolic computing in sense-think-act
cycles [14]. On the other hand, the much older PCT model has its roots
in cybernetics and control systems engineering and says cognition is about
perceptual control, claiming that the minds of living organisms such as
humans resemble analog computers more than digital computers [20]. In
addition, the standard model represents a current consensus on cognition
that has been synthesized from the views of different disciplines while the
PCT model is not widely adopted or well-known. We were interested in
finding out how the PCT model challenges the consensus and whether it
could offer something new or helpful to the table.
The comparison criteria were gathered from existing literature on require-
ments for human-like cognitive architectures as well as recent surveys that
have identified missing functions in existing cognitive architectures and gen-
eral AI systems [30, 40, 33, 16, 13, 25]. Because our purpose was to find out
how promising the models are as high-level layouts for comprehensive, human-
like cognitive architectures, we attempted to select the comparison criteria
so that they captured the functions of human cognition as comprehensively
as possible. We ended up selecting 10 comparison criteria: embodiment and
perception, attention, memory, learning, motivation, emotion, development,
language, imagination, and consciousness. These criteria are summarized in
Table 2. We analysed how both the standard model and the PCT model met
each of the criterion. The analysis was performed on a theoretical level; any
particular technical implementations of the models such as specific cognitive
15
architectures were not considered. The analysis was therefore limited to
capabilities and restrictions determined by high-level design.
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Table 2: The functional comparison criteria used to compare the standard
model and the PCT model.
Function Description
Embodiment and
perception
Capability to process both internal
and external sensory input and
produce motor output
Attention Capability to filter out unimportantsensory input
Memory
Capability to store information as
well as modify and retrieve stored
information
Learning Capability to acquire new knowledgethat affects behavior in the future
Development
Capability to undergo lasting changes
in cognitive structures and processes
over time
Language
Capability to learn symbol systems
such as language for communication
and thought
Motivation Capability to form goals for behaviorbased on internal needs and desires
Emotion
Capability to experience and be
affected by (simulated) physiological
feelings
Imagination
Capability to internally simulate and
manipulate sensory information without
direct sensory input
Consciousness
Capability to mentally or verbally
report own experiences and monitor
self
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4 Results
In this section, we present the comparative analysis of the standard model
and the PCT model that was performed based on the functional criteria
defined in the previous chapter: embodiment and perception, attention,
memory, learning, development, language, motivation, emotion, imagination,
and consciousness. We proceed through the functional criteria one by one.
On each function, we explain what it means and how it was addressed by
each model. A summary of the results is presented in Table 3.
4.1 Embodiment and perception
As discussed in Background, the embodied approach to cognition emphasizes
that the body outside the brain greatly affects cognitive processing in humans.
A human-like model of cognition should therefore include sensorimotor
capabilities for perception and action [40]. Perception means the gathering
of sensory information from the external environment, and action means the
execution of motor actions in the environment. Having better capabilities
to sense and act makes it possible to build more complex understanding
of the world with more potential for development. However, it should be
noted that humans with sensorimotor disabilities do not have significant
impairments in higher-level cognitive processing [33]. What seems to be
important is the ability to interact with the environment in some manner,
not how the body precisely functions and looks like. In order for a model to
be fully embodied and human-like, it must also simulate some kind of inner
physiological state and the capabilities to perceive and regulate it in addition
to the external environment. In living organisms, this internal perception is
called interoception and the regulative physiological process it is needed for
is called allostasis. By allostasis, the body tries to achieve homeostasis - a
balanced physiological state.
The standard model includes an input component called Perception that pro-
cesses sensory information arriving to the system from the external world [14].
This component can consist of several sensory modalities such as vision, audi-
tion and touch, each taking in certain type of knowledge, translating it into
conceptual form via classification or other pattern-recognition mechanisms,
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Table 3: A summary of the functions of the standard model and the PCT
model.
Function Standard model PCT model
Embodiment and
perception
Specialized components for
processing sensory input and
producing motor output
Hierarchical distributed
processing of sensory input
and producing of motor
output
Attention
An attentional process
between working memory
and perception
?
Memory
Separate working, declarative
and procedural memory
components that process
symbolic knowledge and
associated numerical metadata
Hierarchical distributed
associative memory that
stores perceptions and alters
reference signals
Learning
Several mechanisms for
learning both symbolic
knowledge in memories
and sub-symbolic knowledge
in perception and motor
components
Associative learning of
perceptions and reorganization
that modifies the hierarchy
Development ?
Hierarchy modifies itself over
time from initial minimal
configuration
Language
Assumed to emerge over
several cognitive cycles
from the primitives of the
model
Words and grammatical rules
processed as sequence and
program perceptions, meaning
observable by higher levels
through triggered memory
associations
Motivation ?
Reference signals motivate
lower levels, initial intrinsic
physiological and abstract
needs on which higher-level
goals build
Emotion ?
Somatic branch in the
hierarchy converts errors to
physiological changes that are
monitored by the reorganizing
system
Imagination ?
Imagination mode enables
manipulation of perceptions
in memory at any level
without triggering action
Consciousness ?
The reorganizing system
can focus on different parts
of the behavioral hierarchy for
reorganization, monitoring
and testing
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and finally passing it to its specific buffer in working memory. The model
also includes an output component called Motor that converts symbolic
knowledge in working memory into suitable actions in the external world.
This component can also consist of several modalities for different body parts
such as legs and head, each taking in knowledge placed in its own working
memory buffer and translating it into specific actions. However, it is unclear
how or if internal physiological processes and interoceptive capabilities are
taken into account in the standard model.
In the PCT model, perception and action are central concepts [20]. Unlike in
the standard model, there are several components (controllers) that process
input and output signals. Only the lowest layer in the hierarchy is in
direct contact with the body, and each higher-level controller 1) receives
perceptual signals coming from the layer below and passes them upwards;
2) receives a reference signal from the layer above, calculates the error
signal between it and its current perceptual signal, and passes the error
signal downwards as a reference signal. Controllers at different levels in the
hierarchy control different types of perceptions, and all abstract high-level
concepts are constructed as combinations of low-level perceptions. Currently,
nine different types of perceptions have been proposed, ordered here from the
lowest to highest: intensity, sensation, configuration, transition, sequence,
relationship, program, principle, and system concept. At the lowest level,
the variables are direct intensities such as chemical or mechanical effects
that compose sensations such as taste and pressure. Objects correspond to
configurations that consist of multiple sensations. Transitions are perceptions
of movements of lower-level perceptions, sequences are lower-order perceptions
in certain order (i.e. events), and relationships capture relations between
events. Programs are hierarchical structures resembling computer programs
that are composed of sequences of relationships between events as well
as choice points. Examples of program perceptions are recipes and tasks.
Principles are heuristics that guide the selection and execution of programs.
Systems are even more abstract concepts such as society, government or
family that are composed of multiple principles. However, there are missing
details in the PCT model related especially to the higher level perceptions.
Interoception is enabled by a somatic branch in the controller hierarchy
that interacts with the behavioral branch. The behavioral branch at its
lowest level controls by activating muscles while the somatic branch at its
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lowest level controls by changing the physiological state of the system to
allow the action to be taken, for example by increasing heart rate in a living
system. When an error occurs in some high-level controller, changes cascade
downwards in both the behavioral and the somatic branch. When they reach
the bottom of the somatic branch, they are converted into physiological
changes that are then perceived by a separate reorganizing control system.
The reorganizing control system is explained in the section on learning.
4.2 Attention
Attention is a cognitive function that filters out non-relevant perceptual
information coming through different sensory modalities [40, 27]. Attention
is believed to involve three sets of processes: the first one sustains the
alertness or arousal required for attention, the second one orients attention
to a specific sensory modality or location, and the third one performs actual
target detection and functions as the gateway through which information
reaches awareness. In a developmental and human-like model, there should
be certain attentional biases such as paying special attention to objects
exhibiting biological motion (people) and to objects or general spatial regions
to which action is directed.
In the standard model, there is an attentional mechanism that prevents
non-relevant knowledge from passing into working memory [14]. In addi-
tion, working memory can pass knowledge such as expectations down to
the perception component, affecting the translation of perceptual informa-
tion in short-term. However, the exact details of these mechanisms are
unspecified.
In the PCT model, attention is not specifically addressed [20]. It is unclear
if attention is directed by the reorganizing control system, and if so, how.
The reorganizing system is discussed in the section on learning.
4.3 Memory
Memory is a cognitive function related to storing and retrieving information
[40]. Memory enables learning, helping the system better predict the future
and adapt to new situations. Memory can be split into declarative memory
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and procedural memory. Declarative memory stores knowledge related to
things or facts while procedural memory contains knowledge about actions or
skills. Declarative memory can be further divided into episodic memory that
stores life experiences (knowledge about what, when, where) and semantic
memory that stores general knowledge about the world such as concepts and
their relations.
The standard model specifies three types of memories [14]. Working memory
is a temporary workspace where symbols retrieved from long-term memory
and the perception component are dynamically combined into larger struc-
tures and manipulated according to commands of the procedural memory.
These structures may contain partial solutions to problems and short-term
knowledge about, for example, the current task, environment and progress in
goals. The contents of the working memory at any given time can be seen as
representing the "mental" state of the system at that time. Working memory
also includes buffers where knowledge retrieval requests to other components
and their results are stored. Procedural long-term memory stores knowledge
about internal (mental) and external (motor) actions typically in the form of
condition-action rules. In each rule, the condition side is a symbolic pattern
that procedural memory checks against the content of the working memory.
If the pattern matches, the action side is executed. The action may modify
working memory in some way, including the buffers when a request is initiated
to other components. The standard model does not specify how to handle
multiple rules with matching patterns, but in any case a single action should
be selected with influence from numeric metadata. Declarative long-term
memory stores factual or semantic knowledge in a graph structure where
nodes are concepts and edges their relations. Some additional numerical
metadata is involved within each concept, for example measures of how
recently it has been accessed and how similar it is to other concepts. This
metadata affects how and when the concept is retrieved. Retrieval occurs
when a cue is placed in the working memory buffer by procedural long-term
memory. Declarative long-term memory can also store the system’s past
experiences in a conceptualized form, for example a history of the states
of working memory. This is called episodic memory. Declarative memory
would then be divided into episodic memory containing past experiences and
semantic memory containing facts.
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In the PCT model, there is an associative memory that stores perceptions
and is distributed across the controller hierarchy [20]. In each controller, a
reference signal received from above is always augmented by the controller’s
memory of past perceptions, but the four different settings of the perceptual
and memory switches determine whether the augmented (final) reference
signal goes directly back up or passes down to be compared with the per-
ceptual signal received from below, affecting behavior. The settings also
determine whether the perceptual signal received from below goes upwards
and is stored in memory or whether it only goes through the comparator to
affect behavior. An unsolved question is where the reference signals of the
highest level that controls system perceptions come from.
4.4 Learning
By learning new information, a system can better predict the future and
adapt to new situations [40]. Preferably more than one learning mechanism
should be included in a cognitive architecture. Humans seem to utilize at
least three types of learning: supervised learning, unsupervised learning and
reinforcement learning. In supervised learning, the system is provided with
correct labels or answers to input data. Learning occurs by figuring out
the pattern between the input and output that allows the system to predict
correct answers to new, unseen input. In humans, this kind of learning
happens via teaching and imitation. In unsupervised learning, the correct
answers are not given and the task is to find statistical patterns in the input
instead. For example, sensorimotor capabilities can be incrementally and
autonomously learned by creating mappings between executed actions and
changes in sensory input. Human infants do this in at least two ways: motor
babbling and goal babbling. Motor babbling is the execution of seemingly
random motor actions and sensing how they affect the environment. Goal
babbling means repeatedly trying motor actions in an attempt to reach a
certain goal such as reaching or grasping. By building sensorimotor mappings,
the infant also starts to understand the separation between their own body
and the environment as well as the possible ways to use different objects. In
reinforcement learning, a reward follows desired behavior and then encourages
that behavior in the future. For example, a child may learn to repeat a
certain behavior because it elicits a positive emotion.
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Human cognition is assumed to include a process called representational
redescription by which knowledge representations already present in the mind
may transform from implicit and low-level to more explicit and abstract,
becoming more accessible, inspectable and explainable to the mind [11]. At a
certain moment in time, the mind may contain many different (and possibly
redundant) representations of the same type of knowledge, and different
types of knowledge may be in different phases of the explicitation process.
Some knowledge might stay implicit forever, and not all learned knowledge
is initially represented in implicit form. Nevertheless, the capability for
explicitation exists in the mind and the process can be triggered by several
factors. In this view, the mind not only learns new knowledge but also reuses
existing knowledge in new ways. The capability to learn both implicit and
explicit knowledge and have interactive processes between them has also
been defined as one desired feature of a cognitive architecture [30].
In the standard model, there are learning mechanisms that modify infor-
mation in the components of the model as the system gathers experiences
[14]. Each component except working memory has at least one learning
mechanism. Procedural long-term memory has two learning mechanisms,
one for composing new rules based on the execution pattern of previous
rules and another based on reinforcement learning that modifies the logic
of rule selection when multiple rules have matching conditions. Declarative
memory also has two mechanisms: one for adding new concepts, relations
and metadata and another for modifying existing ones. Sub-symbolic (nu-
meric) information in perception and motor components is also assumed to
be learnable. This kind of learning involves the creation and modification of
patterns used in the translation process that converts sensory information
into symbols and symbols into motor actions. The standard model therefore
includes capabilities for learning both implicit knowledge "closer" to the
senses and explicit symbolic knowledge, and interaction between them occurs
through the translation function, which could be implemented as a neural
network, for example. However, exact details of all learning mechanisms
such as their type (supervised, unsupervised or reinforcement learning) or
techniques to implement them are not specified in the standard model.
In the PCT model, the most essential learning mechanism is reorganization
by which the controllers and their properties change either randomly (trial-
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and-error) or by "conscious" effort [20, 23]. The reorganizing system can
be thought of as a separate control system that is driven by intrinsic error,
attempting to keep certain physiological intrinsic perceptions such as body
temperature and nutritional state at inherited reference values. Instead of
outputting behavioral changes, the reorganizing system outputs changes in
the controllers and parameters of the behavioral control hierarchy. These
changes could include adding or removing controllers at new or existing
levels, modifying the reference signal of a controller, changing the connections
between controllers situated at different levels, and so on. Reorganization
can be triggered when there is a persistent conflict between two controllers
that give conflicting reference signals to the same lower-level controller. The
lower-level controller is still able to meet its goal because the effects of
the incoming reference signals are summed together, resulting in a single
reference signal. However, both of the higher-level controllers find that
their own goal is not met; they form a sort of "deadlock" and essentially
become useless. Although reorganization resembles traditional reinforcement
learning, there are differences. In reinforcement learning, the probability of
a certain behavior increases the more it becomes associated with a positive
consequence, i.e. reward. In essence, it is implied that the reward in some
way causes (reinforces) behavior. PCT on the other hand says that a reward
only stops or slows down a reorganization process that indirectly causes
behavioral changes. Reorganization also explains the phenomenon of transfer
in human learning where knowledge gained in one task is used to solve
another unrelated task. In the PCT model, transfer naturally occurs as the
system is capable of controlling the same perceptual variable at different
reference levels despite varying situations and disturbances. Unlike in the
standard model, there is not a translation function or a single level in the
hierarchy through which implicit perceptual knowledge is translated into
explicit symbolic knowledge; knowledge is more implicit in the initial levels of
the hierarchy and goes through an explicitation process over time as higher
layers able to perceive e.g. symbolic knowledge are created.
4.5 Development
When discussing learning machines, Turing thought it would be easier to
create a child-like AI capable of developing into a mature, adult one instead
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of trying to understand and mimic complex adult AI [36]. In Turing’s
vision, the child AI would initially resemble a blank notebook equipped with
very minimal mechanisms that enable further development, and over time,
the notebook would be filled as the child AI is educated through rewards
and punishments. Turing said this would require one to: "...provide the
machine with the best sense organs that money can buy, and then teach
it to understand and speak English. This process could follow the normal
teaching of a child. Things would be pointed out and named, etc.".
A key feature of human cognition indeed is that it involves developmental
processes in addition to learning processes, but this has rarely been taken into
account in the design of cognitive architectures [40]. While learning occurs
as the agent interacts with the environment and acquires new knowledge,
development is the result of the system interacting with itself and changing
its structure and processes [38].
The standard model does not include capabilities for fundamentally changing
the components and processes of the model over time [14].
In the PCT model, the full control hierarchy with 11 levels of controllers is
not supposed to be present initially in the beginning of the system’s lifetime
[20]. However, there may be some built-in structure or blueprints for these
levels so that they do not need to be created from scratch. Development
is then only about filling pre-existing perceptual categories with specific
examples. Initially, the model includes the reorganizing control system and a
simple behavioral control system that consists of reflexive "preprogrammed"
behaviors such as shivering and suckling. At the beginning, there is also
constant unconscious trial-and-error reorganization in the hierarchy that
can manifest as motor babbling, for example. Reorganization stops after
the reorganizing system perceives that the intrinsic error has been reduced
to zero by some behavioral pattern, making that pattern persist until the
intrinsic state for some reason becomes unstable again. The pattern may still
be poor in many ways, causing errors in the behavioral control hierarchy, for
example, but the reorganizing system does not care about the nature of the
behavior as long as it balances the intrinsic state. Eventually, the reorganizing
system also starts to use conscious efforts to direct where reorganization
takes place.
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4.6 Language
In the field of cognitive-functional linguistics, language is not seen as a
separate cognitive module but as interwoven with all cognitive systems,
and the functions of language are emphasized instead of merely its form
[34]. Language has two functions: semiological (thought) and interactive
(communication). Young children first communicate with gestures such
as pointing and eventually acquire language which also becomes a tool for
thought. Each language is a collection of symbolic structures, each structure a
combination of different kinds of symbolic elements: words, markers on words
such as plurals, order of words and intonation. Some general structures may
contain only slots for words, and abstract structures may contain only word
categories such as verbs, nouns and pronouns in certain order. A structure
does not contain meaning; instead, it evokes the construction of meaning, a
process of conceptualization that involves several sources of information such
as knowledge of grammar stored in memory and the current environmental
or psychological context. Language is used to conceptualize many kinds
of mental experiences such as sensory, emotional and motor experiences in
addition to abstract ideas.
In the standard model, it is assumed that language processing capabilities
among other more complex capabilities emerge over several cognitive cycles
from the model’s existing structures and processes without a need for specific
ones for language [14]. However, the model allows for primitives specific to
language processing to be added, for example a structure in working memory
that processes auditory verbal information also known as the phonological
loop.
In the PCT model, words or symbols are assumed to be no different from
other perceptions [20]. There is no specific level for symbolic perceptions.
For example, words belong to sequence perceptions controlled by the fourth
level. By the associative nature of memory in controllers, words - as any
other perceptions - trigger associated lower-level non-word perceptions such
as configurations (objects), events and relationships which then travel up-
wards in the hierarchy and become observable as the meaning of the words.
Grammatical rules, on the other hand, are assumed to belong to program
perceptions controlled by the seventh level. Program perceptions are hi-
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erarchical structures resembling computer programs that are composed of
lower-level perceptions such as relationships between sequences. Programs
also contain decision points or IF statements where the current perceptual
state is compared against the desired goal state. If the goal has been achieved,
the program exits; otherwise, it continues. In a program perception, the
relationships are not between actual behavioral sequences (events) but word
events, i.e. word perceptions, which are transformed into behavior.
4.7 Motivation
Motivation is the underlying force that drives actions and development [40].
In addition to intrinsic physiological needs such as nutrition, water and sleep
that are important for maintaining homeostasis, an exploratory motive - in
other words, curiosity - is thought to be innate in humans and present at
birth. It manifests as a tendency to search for and pay attention to novel
stimuli and test limits of actions. Like scientists, infants are curious to
explore the world by trying new ways of doing things and learning from the
results. This exploration is driven by a need to maximize progress in learning,
meaning experiences that most reduce uncertainty in the predictions of action
consequences are chosen, and this reduction of prediction error is intrinsically
rewarding - not only as a means to achieving a certain goal [26]. Experiences
that are too boring or difficult, i.e. experiences that are already easy to
predict or have a slow learning rate are not as interesting to infants as those
with a fast learning rate. What is notable is that the stage-like developmental
trajectory typical to humans can be simulated with this simple exploratory
learning mechanism without needing to take into account dependencies to
e.g. physiological maturation of the brain. Similarities and differences in
developmental trajectories can also be explained; similarities are due to
the same general motivational process and differences are due to variability
in the environment and experiences offered by it. These findings support
the neuroconstructivist view that the human mind is preprogrammed only
with certain general biases and mechanisms [11]. The exploratory motive is
sometimes separated from a social motive to pay attention to, interact with,
and imitate other people. However, it is not difficult to see how motivation
for learning social skills could also arise from the simple exploratory motive
or physiological needs.
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In the standard model, there currently is no specific mention of motivation
[14]. Working memory includes knowledge about current goals among other
content, and an action whose condition matches the content is selected
and executed. However, it is unclear what these goals are based on, how
completely new goals could be created, and how or if any intrinsic, exploratory
or social motives could be simulated.
In the PCT model, reference signals passed downwards by the higher levels in
the hierarchy work as motivators for the lower levels [20]. Simply, a system
implementing the model is motivated to behave in a certain manner because
they are controlling some internal perceptual variable so as to keep its value
in line with a reference value. In the initial hierarchy that is present in
the beginning of the system’s lifetime, there are inherited or "pre-coded"
controllers that control intrinsic perceptual variables (also called essential
variables) related to physiological needs by random or reflexive behavior. In
addition, there are assumed to be certain intrinsic abstract needs or motives
such as curiosity and a "drive to competence", a natural drive by part of the
reorganizing system to improve the quality of the whole control system by
attempting to minimize its total error. All higher-level goals build on top of
these low-level inherited goals as the hierarchy grows.
4.8 Emotion
Several theories and definitions of emotion exist. According to the theory of
constructed emotion (also known as conceptual act theory), emotions are
psychological constructions or learned conceptualizations of physiological
sensations [2]. For example, an emotion word such as fear refers to a concep-
tual category and not to any universal, basic emotion that is hard-wired in
the brain. As discussed in the previous section about language, a conceptual-
ization or "meaning-making" of events involves several sources of information
such as incoming sensory information, previous conceptualizations (memory)
and the physiological state. When previous conceptualized events of fear
are used to conceptualize current events, fear is experienced. The theory of
constructed emotion challenges classical emotion theories by arguing that
emotions are not reactions to the internal and external environment as much
as they are constructions of it. The reason why similar emotion concepts
29
exist in different cultures is because they happen to serve similar functions
in those cultures. It has been noted that the younger a child is, the more
their choices and behavior are driven by emotion [1].
In the standard model, there is currently no mechanism for emotions
[14].
In the PCT model, emotions result from the physiological changes caused by
the somatic control branch which was explained in the section on perception
[20]. The reorganizing system that monitors the physiological state may not
be aware of the root cause of the emotion, i.e. the location of the error in the
hierarchy, and it may seem like the emotion appeared out of nowhere. The
larger the error, the more negative the emotion. It should be noted here that
the size of the error does not necessarily correspond to the amount of change
in the controlled variable. This is because of a controller-specific parameter
called loop gain that determines how much the incoming perceptual signal
is amplified. In other words, this mechanism gives different importance to
different perceptions (and errors). Changes in perceptions that do not matter
do not result in large errors and strong negative emotions.
4.9 Imagination
It has been pointed out that a crucial ability that enables better control of
the environment and oneself, therefore improving adaptability, is the ability
to predict what could happen under different conditions, in other words
imagination [42]. Imagination is a process by which information that is not
directly received through the senses (i.e. is stored in memory) is used in
mental simulation of possible events and actions [21, 40]. It is suspected that
in human infants, mental simulation initially occurs in dreams and gradually
becomes reliable enough to be used as a tool in waking life. Imagination
allows the system to predict consequences of different actions without needing
to pay the physical cost of action and experience those consequences in the
real world.
In the standard model, imaginative capabilities are not addressed [14].
In the PCT model, there is a mechanism for imagination [20]. A controller
is in imagination mode when neither its memory switch nor its perceptual
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switch is vertically aligned. In this mode, the incoming reference signal
(altered by memory) goes directly back up the hierarchy without passing
through the controller’s comparator. Theoretically, this enables the ability
to internally manipulate perceptions at any level without causing error
calculations and behavior. Thought can be seen as a form of imagination
where the perceptions imagined are word perceptions that belong to the
sequence perceptions controlled by the fourth level. The PCT model also
explains dreaming: in dreaming, the control hierarchy is optimized "off-
line".
4.10 Consciousness
Consciousness has two, partly overlapping definitions [5]. First, consciousness
refers to a system’s capability to in some way globally access the information it
processes which enables further processing, for example mental and/or verbal
reporting. Second, it means the system’s capability to process information
about itself, also known as metacognition.
In the standard model, there is no mention of any mechanism for consciousness
[14].
In the PCT model, the capability for consciousness is assumed to come
through the reorganizing system [20]. The reorganizing system is able to
perceive the behavioral hierarchy itself in a selective manner, to monitor the
perceptions processed by certain parts of it and even inject test perceptions
into controllers in order to see the effects on behavior. The reorganizing sys-
tem also directs the reorganization (learning) process this way. The parts of
the hierarchy that are not monitored function in unconscious mode. However,
there are missing details related to what exactly determines the behavior of
the reorganizing system including the directing of consciousness.
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5 Discussion
In this section, we summarize the results of the previous section, discuss the
benefits and problems of the models, highlight certain problems related to
our study, and offer future directions for research.
The standard model in its current state does not seem to address certain
cognitive functions such as motivation, emotion, development, imagination
and consciousness. The functions addressed by the standard model - percep-
tual and motor capabilities, attention, memory and learning - are those that
have traditionally received more attention in cognitive architecture research.
The PCT model seems to address all functions except attention, therefore
being more comprehensive on a theoretical level. However, the specifics
of the reorganizing system responsible for many of the cognitive functions
are unclear. With its hierarchical and distributed structure and parallel
processing, the PCT model has some resemblance to connectivist models
although it is based on mathematical control theory instead of statistical
techniques such as ANNs. The role of the body outside the brain is central
in the PCT model, and interoceptive capabilities in addition to exteroceptive
capabilities are taken into account unlike in the standard model. It is unclear
how a system implementing the standard model could independently form
its own goals and act to achieve them. What would motivate the system to,
for example, explore and learn social skills and language?
5.1 Development
It is known that in humans, many cognitive capabilities develop over time
and build on top of previous knowledge from birth to adulthood, especially
during the first few years of life. The importance of a developmental approach
to cognitive science has been emphasized [11, 22], and desirable features
for developmental cognitive architectures have been proposed [40]. In ad-
dition, the need for some kind of a "developmental start-up software" has
been recognized in light of the shortcomings of systems based purely on
neural networks [15]. The idea in developmental architectures is that their
structure, processes and knowledge are initially very minimal like those in
the mind of a newborn child. However, they develop over time as the child
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AI system is allowed to interact with its environment, gather experiences
and be educated by humans in either real life or a virtual world. Gradually,
its cognitive architecture matures into an adult-like cognitive architecture.
This capability of a cognitive architecture to modify its own structure and
processes is called constitutive autonomy. [40]. It is related to the require-
ment for bio-evolutionary realism that says a cognitive architecture should
not defy the biological and evolutionary history of living organisms including
humans.
Some regard it problematic that the standard model assumes certain struc-
tures and processes of the mind are innate and fixed while all learned abilities
are represented as knowledge and skills, i.e. as content of a fixed architecture
[32]. In reality, the distinction between innate and learned cognitive abilities
is not so clear, and most of what we think is innate may actually be learned
and changeable. The standard model does not have developmental capabili-
ties; it mainly seems to model the end result of development, i.e. the fixed
structure and processes of an adult-like mind with mechanisms for learning
new knowledge.
In the PCT model, the behavioral hierarchy starts off very minimal but
scales over time as new controllers and completely new layers are created in a
process that seems at least functionally equivalent to the development process
of human cognition. This makes the PCT model perhaps more suitable as a
developmental and thus human-like model. In fact, there already is a popular
book on baby development inspired by PCT [37]. Most of the research
related to developmental, human-like AI has been carried out in the field of
developmental robotics where the focus has been on low-level sensory-motor
capabilities instead of reasoning, planning and other higher-level cognitive
capabilities [40]. These robotic systems are often built by integrating off-
the-shelf modules in a pragmatic manner without any general cognitive
architecture as a basis. We think the PCT model could have potential to
provide such a general architecture for developmental robots.
5.2 Cognitive realism
Another requirement for a cognitive architecture is cognitive realism meaning
its features should not be in conflict with what we know about human
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cognition [30]. However, it does not necessarily need to accommodate every
slight difference that may exist between humans at least what comes to
structure and procedures. An architecture should be grounded in theories
of the basic building blocks of human cognition with individual differences
naturally emerging from the variable content of the architecture that varies
between different instantiations.
Both the standard model and the PCT model have been inspired by theory
instead of practice, the former because it was intended as a theory about living
organisms first and foremost and as a platform for AI applications second.
Although the PCT model seems more comprehensive and is empirically
supported as well [20], some people may doubt whether its nontraditional
view of cognition as control of perceptions is realistic. After all, the model
is not currently widespread and accepted in psychology or cognitive science
and does not represent any kind of consensus unlike the standard model. It
also has some crucial missing details. For example, it is not clear how certain
aspects of it such as the reorganizing system, the higher levels of the control
hierarchy and the somatic control branch could be implemented in an actual
cognitive architecture. It may turn out to be challenging or even impossible
to fully implement the PCT model with currently known techniques and see
whether its assumptions hold in practice although initial steps have been
taken. For example, there have been efforts towards building a PCT-inspired
robotics architecture [44] and a computational framework that supports
interpretation of perceptions and communication [23]. The standard model,
on the other hand, has been synthesized from existing cognitive architectures
and thus is founded on cognitive theories. Despite its theoretical deficiencies,
the standard model and the traditional sense-think-act view may be more
acceptable by the research community and translate more easily into practical
software applications. The standard model is understandably incomplete
because it represents a consensus, and reaching consensus on the missing
cognitive functions could take time. Because it is not complete or even
necessarily intended to be, it also leaves more room for the requirements of
specific applications.
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5.3 Neural plausibility
It has been regarded as problematic that the standard model represents a
horizontal model where a certain level of abstraction (the cognitive level) is
deemed as the starting point for modeling cognition and the levels below
(the neural levels) are ignored simply as implementation [32]. This view
that the mind can exist without the brain like a software independent of the
hardware it runs on is called computational functionalism, and arguments
for and against it have been presented. Developing multi-level models that
take into account all levels of abstraction instead of horizontal models has
been recommended.
Unlike the standard model, the PCT model is intended to be functionally
equivalent to the nervous system, meaning it is in accordance with the
high-level functions of the neural level although does not share a similar
implementation as the brain [20]. The PCT model seems to be multi-
level: in addition to being neurally plausible, it is capable of explaining
functions at the levels of deliberate action. As a singular basis for a cognitive
architecture at the levels of deliberate action - rational, cognitive and social -
connectionism seems insufficient [6, 15]. For example, it is not clear how a
purely connectionist architecture could account for the compositional and
causal nature of thought.
5.4 Autonomy and PCT
Autonomy is one dilemma identified in the design of cognitive architectures
[39]. At one end, the architecture can be allowed to be fully autonomous
so that its behavior cannot be controlled from the outside. At the other
end, the architecture can have zero autonomy and be completely depen-
dent on the commands of other agents. It would naturally seem impor-
tant that in a human-like cognitive architecture, human-like autonomy and
self-determination emerges. However, there may be situations where pro-
gramming the PCT system by hand is necessary, for example when it is
being practically evaluated and natural development would take too much
time. The problem with developmental models such as the PCT model is
that the environmental interaction required for development - and therefore
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development itself - can not necessarily be simulated in a shorter time than is
naturally possible for humans [40]. Of course, different practical applications
require different capabilities. For example, capabilities that are on the level
of a typical one-year-old could be enough for some practical applications
such as companion robots. However, it seems highly impractical to teach
every instantiation of a cognitive architecture implementing the PCT model
for even that long. One solution could be to create some kind of virtual
worlds; worlds that resemble the real world as closely as possible but where
the interactions can be sped up considerably. This is definitely a challenging
task.
The question is how manual programming of the system could be done both
efficiently and in a way that would produce the same results as "natural"
development by reorganization without unintended side consequences. What
if unintended consequences do occur because of natural development or
manual changes in a PCT system? For example, when a single high-level
reference signal is changed, complex changes may cascade down the entire
hierarchy. What if the system starts exhibiting behavior that is harmful to
others in order to achieve its desired perceptions? What crosses the line,
when is human intervention justified, and could a human understand the
system well enough to control it? PCT emphasizes that other people cannot
be predictably controlled unless one knows all the perceptual variables they
are controlling and their relationships, i.e. the workings of their whole control
hierarchy. In the same way, if one were to predictably affect changes in an
artificial control system, a complete understanding of its workings would be
required. Although the basic principles of the PCT model may sound simple
and a very restricted part of the control hierarchy may be understandable to
a human, the hierarchy could quickly scale to such proportions that it would
be difficult to comprehend it. What kind of ethical problems are related to
creating AI systems that are human-like yet controllable? If PCT is correct
and humans are nothing but organic control systems, would there be any
difference between artificial control systems and us significant enough to
justify different treatment?
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5.5 Predictive processing and PCT
Neuroscience has traditionally offered insights on only a limited set of cogni-
tive functions such as sensorimotor capabilities but recent promising theories
such as the predictive processing (PP) theory are argued to be capable of
explaining many others as well [16, 3]. In cognitive neuroscience, the PP
framework has gained a lot of traction as a possible unifying theory of per-
ception, action and cognition [3, 9, 28]. PP suggests the brain is essentially a
probabilistic prediction machine that follows Bayesian principles. The brain’s
purpose is prediction error minimization; knowledge about the world is en-
coded in the brain as probability density functions, and the brain constantly
generates hypotheses (predictions) about oncoming perceptions and attempts
to minimize errors between what it predicts and what it actually perceives.
To do this, the brain uses a generative statistical model that consists of a
hierarchy of levels, each level predicting the output of the level below. Predic-
tions arise from prior probabilities of the top level and propagate down to the
lower levels that calculate the errors between them and actual inputs. The
prediction that best explains reality, i.e. the one with the highest posterior
probability and the smallest error, is then perceived. The errors propagate
back to the top where they trigger changes in the prior probabilities and
cause the rapid generation of new predictions that cancel out the previous
ones. The errors also cause structural long-term changes in the generative
model itself, i.e. learning. Action and attention are tightly coupled with
perception. Action enables active inference - the selection of perceptual data
that conforms to our internal generative model as an alternative to changing
the model. Attention is a mechanism for controlling the precision of errors
and therefore their "weight" or influence on the model. Different views exist
on the exact mechanisms of prediction error minimization, the most known
being predictive coding that was originally developed as an efficient strategy
for signal processing. According to predictive coding, only the prediction
errors propagate back to the top levels and the sensory inputs themselves are
ignored. This kind of predictive processing approach that involves predictive
coding is called hierarchical predictive processing.
Predictive processing may offer an account of perception and action but it is
unclear how the hierarchical generative model could produce higher cognitive
capabilities such as reasoning and thought that are not tied to perceptions
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[41]. Thought is based on combining concepts that represent the world at
different timescales and spatial distances as well as abstract concepts such as
money, and the question is how or if this kind of capability is possible with
the hierarchical generative model of the PP framework. Another problem is
related to motivation [12]. However, evidence exists for predictive processing
capability in infants and it has even been argued to be the most fundamental
learning mechanism in the brain, although its exact workings can change
over development [35]. The PP framework and the PCT model have some
outward similarities. In PP, the central concept is prediction instead of
perception, and the foundation is Bayesian statistics instead of control theory.
In the future, it would be interesting to compare the PCT model and the PP
framework in more detail and find out if there is a possibility to synthesize
the two.
5.6 On sensory disabilities
Studying humans with sensory disabilities could tell more about what human-
like cognition truly means [17]. It is possible that the fundamental structure
and processes underlying cognition are simple and general with complexity
arising from interaction with the environment. All functionality under a
particular cognitive system may not be necessary for a cognitive architecture
to exhibit human-level intelligence and be capable of the everyday activities
of humans. For example, instead of tackling several sensory modalities or
even single complex modalities such as sight and hearing, it could be enough
to implement a very minimal set of perceptual capabilities; capabilities that
enable some form of two-way communication (teaching and learning) and
world-building. This is also in line with the thoughts of Alan Turing:
"We need not be too concerned about the legs, eyes, etc. The example
of Miss Helen Keller shows that education can take place provided that
communication in both directions between teacher and pupil can take place
by some means or other." [36]
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5.7 Practical evaluation
In this thesis, we analyzed only a certain set of cognitive functions. For
example, we could have separately studied decision-making, problem-solving,
social skills, personality, and creativity. In addition, although it may be
useful and interesting to compare models that are not similar to each other,
in this case there were perhaps too many fundamental differences between
the models in terms of theoretical assumptions and level of abstraction that
made a reasonable comparison difficult, leaving the comparison somewhat
lacking. Furthermore, we were of course not able to uncover the benefits
and challenges of the models in practice since the analysis focused only on
theory.
Analyzing and comparing how implementations of the models fare in practice
would tell more about the true benefits and problems of each model. For
example, it would be important to find out whether the implementations are
ecologically realistic, i.e. able to perform activities that are natural to humans
in their everyday life, not only puzzles and games [30]. These activities involve
behavior that is fast and reactive, sequential, routine-like, and mostly learned
via trial-and-error. In practical evaluation, the way the models scale over
time would also become apparent. It would be interesting to find out how
large the controller hierarchy of the PCT model could get in real scenarios
and how the reorganization process could be implemented efficiently. In
the standard model, the translation function between working memory and
sensorimotor components might become one possible bottleneck.
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6 Conclusion
Contemporary analytic AI research has focused on specialized aspects of
cognition such as vision or language processing and deep learning-based
techniques for implementing them. However, these kind of AI systems usually
have problems with learning abstract, causal and conceptual knowledge,
are competent in only limited domains, and can be difficult for humans to
understand, communicate with, and trust. A need for more synthetic research
that studies the development of more general AI systems that are capable
of human-level intelligence has been recognized. In this endeavor, taking
inspiration from theories on human cognition may be beneficial. These kind of
unified theories of the structure and processes of the mind are called cognitive
architectures. However, even though hundreds of these architectures have
been developed over several decades, we seem to be nowhere near achieving
general AI.
In this thesis, we presented a comparative theoretical analysis of two potential
starting points for a comprehensive, general and truly human-like cognitive
architecture: the standard model of the mind and the PCT model. The
standard model of the mind is a recently proposed layout for cognitive
architectures that represents current consensus on human-like cognition
across several disciplines. Although statistical learning of mostly sensorimotor
capabilities is included in the model, its foundations are in the classical
paradigm of cognitive science that models the mind as somewhat computer-
like processor of symbols whose output is a function of input. The older
and less-known PCT model is based on mathematical control theory and
suggests the human mind is composed of a hierarchy of controller units
that attempt to control input perceptions by behavioral output, arguing the
traditional views on cognition are not applicable to living organisms and
therefore human cognition.
The analysis was performed based on functional criteria gathered from liter-
ature on human-like cognition, cognitive architectures, and general artificial
intelligence. These criteria were embodiment and perception, attention,
memory, learning, development, language, motivation, emotion, imagination
and consciousness. Our results indicate that while the PCT model seems
more comprehensive on a theoretical level and may be especially suitable as a
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developmental model, for example as a general architecture for developmental
robots, it has some problems that currently make its full implementation
difficult. The standard model, on the other hand, may translate more easily
into practical implementations.
In the future, additional research is required in order to fill the theoretical
gaps of the standard model and the implementational gaps of the PCT
model. Their implementations should be practically evaluated with methods
that are suitable for general AI systems. This way, their true benefits and
challenges would become more clear. In addition, it could be interesting to
compare how the PCT model differs from the recent predictive processing
framework. Studying cognitive and sensory disabilities could clarify the
definition of human-like cognition and what is really required from human-
like AI, and ethical problems related to autonomy of human-like AI should
be considered.
Outside the traditional, widespread beliefs on what cognition is and what
achieving general AI most likely requires, there can be promising, alternative
paths. What if the knowledge that not only helps us build general, human-
like AI but also understand ourselves can eventually be found in engineering
instead of cognitive science?
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